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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The rise of social media has been one of the most significant developments in the 
online environment in recent years.1 More and more individuals make use of Online 
Social Networks (OSNs) to stay in touch with family and friends, to engage in 
professional networking or to connect around shared interests and ideas. The increased 
availability of personal data online, as well as its accompanying metadata, has given rise 
to new challenges and concerns regarding privacy and security. 
Our recommendations highlight several ways in which policymakers can help 
mitigate privacy and security risks related to OSNs. It describes a variety of approaches, 
ranging from education and awareness to promotion of privacy-enhancing technologies. 
The recommendations focus on empowering users, while at the same time enhancing 
the responsibility and accountability of OSN providers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                      
1 O. Tene, ‘Privacy: the new generations’, International Data Privacy Law 2011, Vol. 1, No. 1, p. 22. 
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2. EDUCATION AND AWARENESS 
 
2.1 A Safer Internet  
Children and youngsters are amongst the largest user groups of online and 
mobile technology in Europe.2 OSNs offer them an attractive means for communication, 
socialisation and information.3 They promote the shaping of identity4 and enhanced 
participation of individuals in political, social and cultural life.5 Unfortunately, the use 
OSNs brings with it certain risks. Children and youngsters may be exposed to online 
risks such as (cyber-) bullying, sexting, exposure to harmful content, privacy harms, but 
also commercial risks.6  
Given these challenges, policymakers all over the world have increased their 
efforts to promote a safer Internet for children and youngsters.7 In 1999, the European 
Commission launched the first Safer Internet Programme, with a view to 
“empower and  protect young people online, by promoting a safe and 
responsible use of Internet and other communication technologies and by 
fighting illegal and harmful online content and conduct.”  
In 2009, The European Commission brought together OSN providers and civil 
society organisations to discuss how to enhance the safety of children and young people 
using OSNs. This cooperation resulted in the Safer Social Networking Principles for 
the EU, which highlighted the important role of “parents, teachers and other carers” in 
educating children about safe and responsible online behaviour.8 
                                                      
2 European Commission, “From a Safer Internet to a Better Internet for Kids” http://ec.europa.eu/digital-
agenda/en/safer-internet-better-internet-kids (last accessed 12 February 2015)  
3 V. Donoso and V. Verdoodt, “White Paper Social media literacy: Time for an update!”, EMSOC Project, 
2014, 6, available on http://emsoc.be/5720-emsoc-white-paper-social-media-literacy-time-for-an-
update/.  
4 E. Vanderhoven, “Raising risk awareness and changing unsafe behavior on social network sites: A design-
based research in secondary education”, Proefschrift ingediend tot het behalen van de academische graad 
van Doctor in de Pedagogische Wetenschappen, UGent, 2014, 231; V. Donoso and V. Verdoodt, o.c., 6. 
5 Council of Europe, Recommendation on the protection of human rights with regard to social networking 
services, 4 April 2012, available on 
https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=1929453&Site=CM&BackColorInternet=C3C3C3&BackColorIntranet
=EDB021&BackColorLogged=F5D383. 
6 G. Mascheroni and K. Ólafsson, “Net Children Go Mobile: risks and opportunities”, Milano, Educatt, 2014, 
5, 91; S. Livingstone, “Developing social media literacy: How children learn to interpret risky 
opportunities on social network sites”, Communications 2014, 39 (3),  283-303, as cited by V. Donoso and 
V. Verdoodt, o.c., 14. 
7 Council of Europe, Recommendation on the protection of human rights with regard to social networking 
services, 4 April 2012, available on 
https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=1929453&Site=CM&BackColorInternet=C3C3C3&BackColorIntranet
=EDB021&BackColorLogged=F5D383; European Commission, Safer Internet Programme, 1999; European 
Commission, Communication on a European Strategy for a Better Internet for Children, 2 May 2012, 
available on https://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/en/news/communication-european-strategy-make-
internet-better-place-kids. 
8 Safer Social Networking Principles for the EU, 10 February 2009, accessible at 
https://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/sites/digital-agenda/files/sn_principles.pdf.  
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More recently, the European Commission’s Digital Agenda for Europe established 
a new policy framework for enhancing the digital and media literacy of social media 
users. This framework includes a strategy for a Better Internet for Children which 
emphasises that:  
“Children, their parents, carers and teachers need to be aware of the risks 
children can encounter online as well as of the tools and strategies to protect 
themselves or cope with such risks. Children need to develop their critical 
thinking and digital and media literacy skills to be able to actively contribute 
in a participatory society. They need access to and advice on how to use tools 
suited to their age that would help them act safely and responsibly online”.9 
Digital and media literacy skills are necessary to reap the full benefits OSNs have 
to offer.10 For this reason, a right to internet and media literacy was introduced by the 
Draft Council of Europe “Guide on Human Rights for Internet Users” and media literacy 
was recognised as a key requirement for protecting human rights in an OSN context. 11 
In the same vein, the European Council of Ministers and the European Commission have 
called to  
“step up the implementation of strategies to include the teaching of online 
safety and digital competences in schools, encourage the use of the Internet 
across school subjects and in this respect support adequate teacher 
training.”12 
 
2.2 The role of schools 
Schools are best positioned to reach the majority of all children regardless of 
their age, background or socio-economic status.13 They can introduce internet safety in a 
pedagogic context that allows for solid learning over time.14  The European Commission 
recognises the importance of the role of education in its strategy for a Better Internet for 
Children, which includes “scaling up awareness and empowerment through digital 
                                                      
9 European Commission, Communication on a European Strategy for a Better Internet for Children, 2 May 
2012, 8. 
10 V. Donoso and V. Verdoodt, “White Paper Social media literacy: Time for an update!”, EMSOC Project, 
2014, 13, available on http://emsoc.be/5720-emsoc-white-paper-social-media-literacy-time-for-an-
update/. 
11 Draft Guide on Human Rights for Internet Users, Council of Europe, 22 October 2013, available on 
http://www.coe.int/t/informationsociety/Rights%20of%20Internet%20Users/Draft%20Council%20of
%20Europe%20Guide%20on%20Human%20Rights%20for%20Internet%20Users.pdf; Recommendation 
on the protection of human rights with regard to social networking services, Council of Europe, 4 April 
2012, available on https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=1929453, as cited by V. Donoso and V. Verdoodt, 
o.c., 14. 
12 Council conclusions of 26 November 2012 on the European strategy for a Better Internet for Children, 
O.J. 19 December 2012, available on http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52012XG1219%2804%29.  
13 European Commission, Communication on a European Strategy for a Better Internet for Children, 2 May 
2012, 8. 
14 S. Livingstone, L. Haddon, J. Vincent, G. Mascheroni and K. Ólafsson, Net Children Go Mobile. The UK 
report, London, London School of Economics and Political Science, 2014, 6. 
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literacy and online safety in all EU schools” as one of its main objectives.15 Both parents 
and children have indicated that they consider the school environment as an important 
place to receive information about online safety.16 In this regard, the Council of Europe 
has urged its Member States to:  
“foster awareness initiatives for parents, carers and educators to supplement 
information provided by the social networking service, in particular in respect 
of much younger children when they participate in social networks”.17  
The educational agenda of schools is broad and generally aimed at preparing pupils for the 
public life.18 More in particular, their task includes raising awareness of e-safety among 
pupils and offering guidance and training in responsible Internet use, including the use of 
OSNs.19 Research has shown that children and youngsters are better at finding information 
online than they are at avoiding some of the risks they are faced with.20 This is why e-
safety, digital and media literacy have formally made it into school curricula in many 
European countries.21 In addition, other entities (e.g., youth organisations) can be a 
valuable and fruitful environment to raise awareness and educate youngsters regarding 
responsible internet use.22  
  
2.3 Recommendations 
  Make media literacy and online safety an effective component of school 
curricula.  
Even though media literacy and online safety is formally included in the school 
curriculum, current implementation is inconsistent or non-existent in a lot of 
schools.23 The problem here is that the curriculum only mentions target objectives on a 
macro level, which are vague and do not define the concrete content of courses or give 
                                                      
15 European Commission, Communication on a European Strategy for a Better Internet for Children, 2 May 
2012,  
16 B. O’Neill and E. Staksrud, Final recommendations for policy, London, EU Kids Online, LSE, September 
2014, 13, 17 available on 
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/59518/1/__lse.ac.uk_storage_LIBRARY_Secondary_libfile_shared_repository_Cont
ent_EU%20Kids%20Online_EU_Kids_Online_Final%20recommendations%20Sep%202014.pdf.   
17 Recommendation CM/Rec(2012)4 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on the protection of 
uman rights with regard to social networking services 
18 E. Vanderhoven, o.c., 119. 
19 B. O’Neill and E. Staksrud, o.c., 16. 
20 S. Livingstone, “What is media literacy?”, Intermedia 2004, 32 (3), pp. 18-20, available on 
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/1027/.  
21 E. Vanderhoven, o.c., 12. In Flanders, media literacy has been formally included in the curriculum of 
secondary education. See I. Vos and D. Terryn, Charting Media and Learning in Europe, MEDEANET Project, 
2013, http://www.medeanet.eu/sites/default/files/MEDEAnet_Deliverable_4.3_Annual_Report_2013.pdf.  
22 R. De Wolf, K. Willaert and J. Pierson, “Managing privacy boundaries together: Exploring individual and 
group privacy management strategies in Facebook “Computers in Human Behavior 2014, Vol. 35, 444-454. 
 23 Safer Internet Programme, Assessment report on the status of online safety education in schools across 
Europe, 2009, as cited by E. Vanderhoven, o.c., 13. 
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insights into how these objectives are to be attained.24 As a result, implementation at the 
classroom level of online safety appears to be inconsistent.25 
To overcome these issues, efforts to ascertain equality of access and 
opportunities for all children are necessary. Furthermore, government should support 
schools and provide them with sufficient resources for the development of pupils’ 
digital and media literacy skills.26 In addition, the actual implementation of the online 
safety curriculum would benefit from more guidance on the concrete content of 
courses. 
 
Promote ICT training among teachers and encourage peer-to-peer learning.  
Teachers can benefit from training on both the opportunities and the challenges 
of OSNs. As a result, certain scholars recommend that the development of digital skills 
should become a compulsory component of teacher training programmes.27 At the 
moment, teacher training programs are mostly focused on reproducing current 
educational models and classroom didactics.28 However, the use of OSNs might reverse 
this trend, as it offers opportunities for peer-to-peer learning. Teachers-in-training can 
exchange experiences online and learn from others’ best practices all over the world.29 
Even though such networks and online resources are already widely available in Europe, 
only a minority is exploiting the benefits they have to offer. 30 Therefore, government 
should support the sharing of knowledge and educational materials among the teaching 
community. Teacher training should not necessarily focus (only) on making the teachers 
themselves more tech-savvy. Perhaps even more important is that teachers are educated 
as to what it means for youngsters to be active on an OSN, so they can understand the 
benefits and risks from their perspectives. The latter approach also facilitates the 
communication between teachers and their students. In other words: developing digital 
skills consists of both technical and social components.     
                                                      
24 R. Vanderlinde, J. van Braak and R. Hermans, “Educational technology on a turning point: Curriculum 
implementation in Flanders and challenges for schools”, Educational Technology Research and 
Development, 57(4), 573-584, as cited by E. Vanderhoven, o.c., 12. 
25 Safer Internet Programme, Assessment report on the status of online safety education in schools across 
Europe, 2009, as cited by E. Vanderhoven, o.c., 12. 
26 B. O’Neill and E. Staksrud, “Policy implications and recommendations: Now what?” in S. Livingstone, L. 
Haddon, & A. Görzig (Eds.), Children, risk and safety on the Internet. Research and policy challenges in 
comparative perspective (1st ed., Vols. 1–26, Vol. 26), Bristol/Chicago: The Policy Press, as cited by E. 
Vanderhoven, o.c., 223. 
27 B. O’Neill and E. Staksrud, Final recommendations for policy, London, EU Kids Online, LSE, September 
2014, 17, available on 
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/59518/1/__lse.ac.uk_storage_LIBRARY_Secondary_libfile_shared_repository_Cont
ent_EU%20Kids%20Online_EU_Kids_Online_Final%20recommendations%20Sep%202014.pdf.   
28 V. Donoso and V. Verdoodt, “White Paper Social media literacy: Time for an update!”, EMSOC Project, 
2014, 28, available on http://emsoc.be/5720-emsoc-white-paper-social-media-literacy-time-for-an-
update/. 
29 V. Donoso and V. Verdoodt, o.c., 29. 
30 European Schoolnet and University of Liège, “Survey of Schools: ICT in Education, Benchmarking Access, 
Use and Attitudes to Technology in Europe’s Schools, February 2013, available on 
https://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/sites/digital-agenda/files/KK-31-13-401-EN-N.pdf. 
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Efforts should also be made to improve the quality and consistency of ICT 
training across institutions. Teachers often require ongoing support for the 
implementation of ICT into their teaching and learning. For instance, ICT coordinators in 
school could provide the necessary pedagogical and technical guidance on a permanent 
basis.31  
Finally, keeping programmes and teachers’ up-to-date is a challenge. 
Technologies develop much faster than the school curriculum, study programmes and 
materials. Therefore a sustainable model for training of teachers should be developed. 
This would imply the continuous training and cooperation with experts (e.g. 
researchers, awareness or e-safety centers etc.).32 
 
Evaluate the practical implementation of educational programmes about 
online safety.  
Educational prevention programmes are aimed at enhancing awareness of OSN 
risks and providing information of available countermeasures. In this regard, Insafe - the 
European network of safer Internet centres - developed a number of prevention and 
awareness campaigns and materials.33  However, research has shown that campaigns on 
their own do often not achieve their goals, probably because they do not always have a 
theoretical basis or are not evidence-based.34 Whereas governments tend to invest in 
the development of educational material and campaigns, no resources are allocated to 
assessment or evaluation of such campaigns.35 Consequently, it is unclear whether these 
initiatives have the desired impact on youngsters or what is needed in order to have a 
positive effect. Therefore, it is crucial that efforts are made to assess existing prevention 
programmes about online safety, instead of merely supporting the development of new 
ones.36  
 
                                                      
31 Idem. However it should be kept in mind here that at the moment, ICT coordinators usually lack 
pedagogical and e-safety knowledge. Therefore ICT coordinators should receive specific pedagogical 
training, it cannot merely be an ICT technician.   
32 The Media Coach initiative funded by the Flemish government and Evens Foundations can serve as an 
example. See http://www.linc-vzw.be/projecten/mediacoach-een-mediawijs-traject-voor-professionelen.  
33 Insafe is “a European network constituted by 30 national Safer Internet Centres in EU Member states 
and in Iceland, Norway and Russia. Every national Centre implements awareness and educational 
campaigns, runs a helpline, and works closely with youth to ensure an evidence-based, multi-stakeholder 
approach to creating a better internet.” See http://www.saferinternetday.org/web/guest/about. See also 
Insafe, “Educational resources for teachers”, 2014, available on 
http://lreforschools.eun.org/web/guest/insafe.  
34 F. Mishna, C. Cook, M. Saini, M.-J. Wu and A. MacFadden, R., Interventions to prevent and reduce cyber 
abuse of youth: A systematic review. Research on Social Work Practice, 21(1), 2010, 5–14 as cited by E. 
Vanderhoven, o.c., 231. See also Vanderhoven, E., Raes, A. & Schellens, T. (2015). Interpretation in the 
process of designing effective learning materials: A design-based research example. In Smeyers, P., 
Bridges, D., Burbules, N., & Griffiths, M. (Eds.). (2015). International handbook of interpretation in 
educational research methods (2 Vols.). Dordrecht: Springer. Doi: 10.1007/978-94-017-9282-0_60 
35 S. Livingstone and M. E. Bulger, “A global agenda for children’s rights in the digital age. 
Recommendations for developing UNICEF’s research strategy”, London, LSE, 2013, 20, 22. 
36 E. Vanderhoven, o.c., 223. 
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Stimulate media and industry engagement for raising awareness of online 
safety.  
Educators are not solely responsible for raising awareness about online safety.37 
First of all, general media, such as television or newspapers, can help to raise awareness. 
These awareness-raising activities could benefit from a cooperation between the media 
industry and academia, as the latter can provide guidance and evidence-based 
research.38 In addition, the industry must recognize it has a responsibility of its own in 
providing a safer online environment for children and raising awareness of online 
safety.39  
 
 
  
                                                      
37 E. Vanderhoven, o.c., 224. 
38 V. Donoso and V. Verdoodt, “White Paper Social media literacy: Time for an update!”, EMSOC Project, 
2014, 41, available on http://emsoc.be/5720-emsoc-white-paper-social-media-literacy-time-for-an-
update/. 
39 O’Neill and Staksrud, “Policy implications and recommendations: Now what?” in S. Livingstone, L. 
Haddon, & A. Görzig (Eds.), Children, risk and safety on the Internet. Research and policy challenges in 
comparative perspective (1st ed., Vols. 1–26, Vol. 26), Bristol/Chicago: The Policy Press. as cited by E. 
Vanderhoven, o.c., 224.  
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3. AT THE LIMITS OF “NOTICE & CONSENT” 
3.1 Why notice?  
OSN providers provide privacy notices in an attempt to secure the “informed 
consent” of their users. The current approach, whereby the user is forced to accept 
lengthy privacy notices before being able to access the service, has been subject of 
increasing criticism.40 Before discussing these critiques, we must note that privacy 
notices can do more than just “informing” consent. Notices can fulfill an array of other 
functions, provided those functions are properly understood by all stakeholders 
involved.41 If drafted properly, privacy notices can: 
a) promote fairness; 
b) help to compensate knowledge asymmetries; 
c) enable data subjects to contest abusive data practices; 
d) have a ‘purifying’ effect on data controller’s actual practices; and 
e) enhance the accountability of data controllers.42 
 
3.2 Regulatory failure 
Notice and consent mechanisms start from the assumption that data subjects can 
fully understand what will happen if they consent to the processing of their data.43 In 
practice, privacy notices are often complex, provider-centred and lack meaningful 
transparency.44 Even though they are intended for users, they seem to be drafted by 
lawyers for lawyers.45 As a result, OSN users often do not read or do not fully 
understand this type of legal communication.46  
From an OSN provider’s perspective, there is an economic incentive to collect as 
much data as possible.47 Many service providers see privacy notices merely as a 
                                                      
40 For a discussion see B. Van Alsenoy, “D6.1 Legal requirements for privacy-friendly model privacy 
policies”, SPION Project, 30 June 2012, 16, available on www.spion.me. See also House of Commons 
Science and Technology Committee, “Responsible use of data”, Fourth Report of Session 2014-15, 19 
November 2014, p. 18 et seq, accessible at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmselect/cmsctech/245/245.pdf 
41 For a comprehensive analysis see R. Calo, ‘Against Notice Skepticism in privacy (and elsewhere)’, Notre 
Dame Law Review 2012, vol. 87, 1027 et seq. 
42 See B. Van Alsenoy, D6.1 Legal requirements for privacy-friendly model privacy policies”, l.c., 7-10. 
43 Article 29 Working Party, “Opinion 15/2011 on the definition of consent”, 13 July 2011, 9, 17, available 
on http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2011/wp187_en.pdf. 
44 V. Donoso and V. Verdoodt, “White Paper Social media literacy: Time for an update!”, EMSOC Project, 
2014, 21, available on www.emsoc.be. 
45 Idem. 
46 E. Wauters, V. Donoso and E. Lievens, “Why are Terms of Use so difficult to understand? Reflections on 
how to optimize transparency for users in Social Networking sites”, EuroCPR, Brussels, 24-25 March 2014. 
See also A. Bechmann (2014). “Non-Informed Consent Cultures: Privacy Policies and App Contracts on 
Facebook”, Journal of Media Business Studies, Vol. 11, Issue 1, 21-38. 
47 P. Lambert, Social Networking: Law, Rights and Policy, Clarus Press, 3 April 2014, 107. 
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compliance burden on which only a minimum amount of effort should be spent.48 By 
obtaining consent of their users, they try to avoid any constraints for the future use of 
the data they collect and shield themselves against potential complaints or legal 
actions.49 From a marketing perspective, organisations have an incentive to embellish 
potentially unpopular processing practices as much as possible. As a result, privacy 
notices are often characterised by vagueness, obscurity and boilerplate language.50 
Another reason why privacy notices fail their regulatory objective in practice relates to 
the enforcement and oversight. At the moment, many DPAs only have limited means and 
resources to enforce data protection laws.51 As a result, there is no strong push for OSN 
providers to provide more meaningful transparency. 
 
3.3 Recommendations 
Apply a clear distinction, both conceptually and in practice, between ‘notice’ 
and ‘consent’. 52  Debates regarding the (in)utility of privacy notices often confound two 
very distinct issues, namely transparency on the one hand, and legitimacy on the other. 
Lengthy privacy notices generally do not lead to informed consent.53  This finding does 
not, however, imply that comprehensive privacy notices are pointless. Comprehensive 
notices can be instrumental in the evaluation of compliance an organisation’s data 
practices, promote basic fairness of processing (by putting data subjects ‘on notice’ that 
their personal data is being processed), and promote general awareness of data subject 
rights.  
Actual “legitimacy” requires substantive justification. Consent should not be 
employed as a freestanding, “lazy” justification for the processing of personal data.54 
Data processing can only be truly legitimate if it is proportionate and if all the interests 
of the different actors involved have been taken into account.55 OSN providers are 
responsible for ensuring that a fair balance between the privacy interests of individuals 
                                                      
48 P. Van Eecke and M. Truyens, “EU study on the Legal analysis of a Single Market for the Information 
Society - New rules for a new age?”, November 2009, 42. 
49 B. Van Alsenoy, E. Kosta and J. Dumortier, “Privacy notices versus informational self-determination: 
Minding the gap”, International Review of Law, Computers & Technology 2013, p. 6. 
50 P. Van Eecke and M. Truyens (eds.), ‘The future of online privacy and data protection’, l.c., p. 42. See also 
R. Leenes and E. Kosta, “Taming the cookie monsters with Dutch law – a tale of regulatory failure”, 
Computer Law & Security Review 2015, Vol. 31, Issue 2, forthcoming.  
51 R. Leenes and E. Kosta, “Taming the cookie monsters with Dutch law – a tale of regulatory failure”, l.c., 
forthcoming. 
52 B. Van Alsenoy, E. Kosta and J. Dumortier, “Privacy notices versus informational self-determination: 
Minding the gap”, l.c.,  p. 8 et seq.. 
53 R. Leenes and E. Kosta, “Taming the cookie monsters with Dutch law – a tale of regulatory failure”, 
Computer Law & Security Review 2015, Vol. 31, Issue 2, forthcoming. 
53 Idem. 
54 R. Brownsword, ‘Consent in Data Protection Law: Privacy, Fair Processing and Confidentiality’, in S. 
Gutwirth, Y. Poullet, P. De Hert, C. de Terwangne and S. Nouwt (eds.), Reinventing Data Protection, 2009, 
Springer, p. 90. 
55 A. Rouvroy and Y. Poullet, “The Right to Informational Self-Determination and the Value of Self-
Development: Reassessing the Importance of Privacy for Democracy.” in S. Gutwirth, Y. Poullet, P. De Hert, 
C. Terwange and S. Nouwt (eds.), Reinventing Data Protection?, Springer, 2009, 73. 
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and commercial interests of business is maintained at all times. Policymakers and 
regulators should set clear boundaries for OSN providers and third parties, which will 
make it easier to determine whether certain processing activities are acceptable or 
not.56 
“Requiring” vs. “requesting” information. There is a qualitative difference 
between information which is necessary for a service to function technically and 
information which is collected to support a company’s business model.57 For consent to 
be freely given, individuals should have the ability to give free and specific consent to 
receiving behavioural advertising independently of his access to the social network 
service.58  
Explore more effective ways of presenting information.59 Information can be 
presented in many different ways (e.g., layering, visualisation or labelling of 
information), which can facilitate the comprehension of complex legal information. In 
addition, feedback and awareness tools can promote greater understanding and 
reflection of individuals.60 Such tools can show data subjects the possible outcome of a 
potentially privacy-relevant action in a particular system, and can provide feedback. In 
turn, individuals can gain greater knowledge of the possible privacy implications of their 
actions. Visualization tools have been proven useful for users to comprehend their 
online relationships and access control.61 
Promote collective transparency mechanisms. Different services have different 
terms and conditions and different ways of providing information to their consumers. 
The diversity of information makes it difficult for individual consumers to take informed 
decisions and understand the differences between service providers. Consumer 
information should be communicated in comparable and ideally standardized and 
machine-readable format.62 This would facilitate the development of more “collective” 
transparency, e.g. in the form of comparison tools offered by a non-governmental 
organisation or consumer protection agency.  
                                                      
56 See also B. Van Alsenoy, V. Verdoodt, A. Kuczerawy and G. Acar, D9.6.3 Evaluation of the legal 
framework applicable to Online Social Networks, January 2015, 30 accessible at www.spion.me. 
57 Based on House of Commons Science and Technology Committee, “Responsible use of data”, Fourth 
Report of Session 2014-15, 19 November 2014, 25, accessible at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmselect/cmsctech/245/245.pdf  
58 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, “Opinion 15/2011 on the definition of consent”, WP187, 25 
November 2014, p. 18. 
59 V. Donoso and V. Verdoodt, o.c., 22. 
60 Freebu, a tool that was developed within the SPION Project, is an example of a feedback and awareness 
tool. See http://www.spion.me/workpackage/feedback-and-awareness-in-online-social-networks. 
61 Lipford, H. R., Besmer, A., & Watson, J. , “Understanding Privacy Settings in Facebook with an Audience 
View, in Proceedings of the 1st Conference on Usability, Psychology, and Security. Berkeley, 2008 USENIX 
Association, pp. 2:1–2:8 accessible at http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1387649.1387651 and S. 
Egelman, A. Oates and S.  Krishnamurthi, “Oops, I Did It Again: Mitigating Repeated Access Control Errors 
on Facebook”, in Proceedings of the SIGCHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems, 2011, New 
York, ACM pp. 2295–2304. 
62 N. Helberger, “Form matters: Informing consumers effectively”, Amsterdam Law School Legal Studies 
Research Paper No. 2013-71 / Institute for Information Law Research Paper No. 2013-10, 49 accessible at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2354988.  
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4. DEFAULT MATTERS 
4.1 The “power of default” 
Many OSN users do not or rarely modify default privacy settings.63 It is 
therefore important that these settings have pre-selected values that respect the users’ 
privacy.64 The ideal situation would be for OSN users’ privacy to be protected by default, 
without requiring any actions from them.65  
When reflecting on the importance of default settings, one should take into 
account that several factors complicate the decision-making process of OSN users. First 
of all, privacy choices are affected by incomplete information.66 For instance, many times 
an information asymmetry between the OSN user and provider exists, as the latter is the 
only party that is fully aware of the amount of data being collected, the purposes for 
which this data is being used and which third parties have access.67 Many privacy 
decisions do not reflect user expectations because  
“the complexity of the privacy decision environment leads individuals to arrive 
at highly imprecise estimates of the likelihood and consequences of adverse 
events, and altogether ignore privacy threats and modes of protection”.68   
Even if information would be complete, OSN users’ ability to collect and process 
all this information is limited. The search for relevant information is time- and energy-
                                                      
63 Article 29 Working Party Opinion 5/2009 on online social networking, 12 June 2009, 7, 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2009/wp163_en.pdf. A distinction should be 
made however, between privacy settings which enable control over “social privacy” (i.e. which allow users 
to limit access to “friends” or to “block” certain users) and privacy settings which enable users to control 
collection and use of data by third parties. For example, Facebook currently offers a (link to) an opt-out for  
behavioural profiling via cookies. However, this information is only provided under the “Ads” heading 
rather than the “privacy heading”. Individuals configuring their “privacy” settings might thus mistakenly 
believe that all their data is protected, while in reality they are still being tracked by Facebook across 
websites. It should also be noted that rarely modifying the default privacy settings is not necessarily an 
indication of users not caring about their privacy. While users have limited control options in controlling 
their information flow towards third parties (institutional privacy), they often make use of social 
strategies for their social privacy (and thus move beyond the available settings in their privacy 
management).  
64 J. Ausloos, E. Kindt, E. Lievens, P. Valcke and J. Dumortier, “Guidelines for Privacy-Friendly Default 
Settings”, ICRI Working Paper Series, 18 February 2013, 4. 
65 Ann Cavoukian, Privacy by Design and the Emerging Personal Data Ecosystem, October 2012, 18,  
http://privacybydesign.ca/content/uploads/2012/10/pbd-pde.pdf; J. Ausloos, E. Kindt, E. Lievens, P. 
Valcke and J. Dumortier, “Guidelines for Privacy-Friendly Default Settings”, ICRI Working Paper Series, 18 
February 2013, 24. 
66 A. Acquisti and J. Grossklags, “What Can Behavioral Economics Teach Us About Privacy”, presented as 
Keynote Paper at ETRICS 2006, 1-2. 
67 A. Acquisti and J. Grossklags, “Privacy and Rationality in Individual Decision Making”, IEEE Security & 
Privacy, vol3, No 1, January/February 2005, 27; R. Balebako, P.G. Leon, H. Almuhimendi, P.G. Kelly, J. 
Mugan, A. Acquisti, L.F. Cranor and N. Sadeh, “Nudging Users Towards Privacy on Mobile Devices”, CHI 
2011, May 7 - 12 2011, Vancouver, BC, Canada, 1; I. Adjerid, A. Acquisti, L. Brandimarte, G. Loewenstein, 
“Sleights of Privacy: Framing, Disclosures, and the Limits of Transparency, Symposium on Usable Privacy 
and Security (Soups) 2013, 24-26 July 2013, Newcastle, UK, 2. 
68 A. Acquisti and J. Grossklags, “What Can Behavioral Economics Teach Us About Privacy”, presented as 
Keynote Paper at ETRICS 2006, 3. 
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consuming and individuals have cognitive limitations, which implies that they can only 
rationalise to a certain extent about all available data (so-called ‘bounded rationality’).69 
In other words, OSN users’ cognitive constraints causes them to deviate from so-called 
“rational” privacy decisions.70  
The nature and design of an OSN platform may also influence privacy decisions. 
Research has shown that for example Facebook users have problems with accurately 
estimating their audience on OSNs.71 The lack of social transparency hinders their 
understanding of the possible consequences of sharing their personal information on 
the platform. Consequently, they might share more information than they would 
otherwise.  
 
4.2 Privacy and data protection by default 
The concept of ‘Privacy by default’ originates from Ann Cavoukian, the former 
information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario, Canada, as part of her concept of 
‘Privacy by design’. According to Cavoukian, privacy-friendly default settings are one 
of the seven privacy principles of ‘Privacy by design’.72 In Europe, this concept has 
also been promoted by the Council of Europe urging Member States to: 
“promote best practices for users. This includes default privacy-friendly 
settings that limit access to contacts selected by users themselves […].”73 
More recently, the concept of privacy or data protection by default was taken up by the 
European Commission in their proposal for a general Data Protection Regulation 
and the European Parliament in its first reading.74 Once the Regulation comes into force, 
the principle of data protection by default will oblige the OSN provider to implement  
                                                      
69 M.A. Eisenberg, “The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract”, 47(2) Stanford Law Review, 1995, 
214; H.A. Simon, “Models of bounded rationality. Trustme: Anonymous management of trust relationships 
in decentralize P2P systems”, in N. Shahmehri, R.L. Graham & G. Caronni (Eds.), Peer-to-peer computing, 
Washington DC, USA: IEEE Computer Society, 142-149; E. Wauters, E. Lievens, P. Valcke, D1.2.4: A legal 
analysis of Terms of Use of Social Networking Sites, including a practical legal guide for users: ‘Rights & 
obligations in a social media environment’, 19 December 2013, 8, www.emsoc.be. 
70 Y. Wang, P.G. Leon, A. Acquisti, L.F. Cranor, A. Forget and N. Sadeh, “A Field Trial of Privacy Nudges for 
Facebook”, CHI 2014, Toronto, ON, Canada, 1 May 2014, 1. 
71 M.S. Bernstein, E. Bakshy, M. Burke and B. Karrer, “Quantifying the Invisible Audience in Social 
Networks”, CHI 2013, April 27–May 2, 2013, Paris, France, 2. 
72 A. Cavoukian, 7 Foundational Principles, 11 December 2014, available on 
http://www.privacybydesign.ca/index.php/about-pbd/7-foundational-principles/, (date of consultation). 
73 Council of Europe, Recommendation on the protection of human rights with regard to social networking 
services, 4 April 2012, available on 
https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=1929453&Site=CM&BackColorInternet=C3C3C3&BackColorIntranet
=EDB021&BackColorLogged=F5D383. See also Article 29 Working Party, “Opinion 5/2009 on online 
social networking”, WP163, 12 June 2009, p. 7. 
74 Article 23 Proposal for a General Data Protection Regulation, COM/2012/011 final, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52012PC0011; Article 23 (2): “In particular, those 
mechanisms shall ensure that by default personal data are not made accessible to an indefinite number of 
individuals and that data subjects are able to control the distribution of their personal data.” See European 
Parliament legislative resolution of 12 March 2014 on the proposal for a General Data Protection 
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“privacy settings on services and products which should by default comply 
with the general principles of data protection, such as data minimisation and 
purpose limitation.”75 
4.3 Recommendations76  
Awareness and active choice.  Only a limited number of users change their 
default settings or is even aware that their settings can be tweaked. OSN providers 
should wait for an affirmative action of the user before sharing his or her information to 
a broader audience than just “friends” or “connections”. In addition, no changes should 
be made to default settings without the user’s affirmative consent. Mere notification of 
changes is not enough.77  
Default settings should be simple, logical and easy to find. An overabundance 
of settings can confuse and even intimidate users.78 Default settings should not be too 
overly complex and should focus on the most important questions. Therefore, a simple 
and logical privacy pane is necessary. OSN providers should aim for a comprehensive 
“dashboard”, making sure that settings can be found in one place without having to click 
on numerous hyperlinks.79 At the same time, individuals should also be able to exercise 
audience controls at the moment of providing information.  
Enhance audience visibility. OSN users often underestimate their actual 
audience when disclosing personal information on their profiles. In this regard, more 
‘social transparency’ is required, for instance by improving audience visibility by default.  
Social transparency can nudge users into a more cautious approach to online 
information sharing, as they are forced to think about who is actually watching or 
listening. For instance, OSN providers could offer an indication of how many people 
really view a picture or read a statement. Audience visualizations have not been 
integrated in ONSs so far, even though they are proven useful for users’ privacy 
management.80  
                                                                                                                                                                      
Regulation, available on http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-
TA-2014-0212+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN.  
75 Recital 61 European Parliament legislative resolution of 12 March 2014 on the proposal for a General 
Data Protection Regulation.  
76 See J. Ausloos, E. Kindt, E. Lievens, P. Valcke and J. Dumortier, “Guidelines for Privacy-Friendly Default 
Settings”, ICRI Working Paper Series, 18 February 2013; V. Verdoodt and B. Van Alsenoy, “Guidelines for 
Privacy-Friendly Default Settings”, SPION Project, December 2014. 
77 V. Verdoodt and B. Van Alsenoy, “Guidelines for Privacy-Friendly Default Settings”, SPION Project, 
December 2014, 12. See also A. Kuczerawy and F. Coudert, “Privacy Settings in Social Networking Sites: Is 
It Fair?” in S. FischerHübner et al. (Eds.), Privacy and Identity 2010, IFIP AICT 352, 235. 
78 J. Ausloos, E. Kindt, E. Lievens, P. Valcke and J. Dumortier, “Guidelines for Privacy-Friendly Default 
Settings”, ICRI Working Paper Series, 18 February 2013, 23. 
79 Of course there is also the possibility of contextual privacy settings, these could be have additional 
value.  
80 See Lipford, H. R., Besmer, A., & Watson, J. , “Understanding Privacy Settings in Facebook with an 
Audience View, in Proceedings of the 1st Conference on Usability, Psychology, and Security. Berkeley, 2008 
USENIX Association, pp. 2:1–2:8 accessible at http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1387649.1387651 and S. 
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Ensure an appropriate level of granularity. OSN providers should offer privacy 
(default) settings which allow users to freely and specifically consent to any access to 
their profile’s content that is beyond the contacts they selected themselves.81 Thus, they 
should allow and stimulate customised settings, whereby users can easily and exactly 
select a specific audience for their separate posts. Furthermore, OSN users should be 
able to exercise control over the collection and use of their personal information by the 
OSN provider and third parties. Finally, OSN providers should enable users to exercise 
some control over the information about them that is being posted by fellow users. 
 Consider expiration dates for information shared by OSN users.82 The 
information people share on their profiles remains visible unless it is deleted post-by-
post. This task costs a lot of effort and is time-consuming. A time setting would allow 
OSN users to specify for each different post or picture after which period of time it 
should be automatically deleted or its visibility reduced.  
 
  
                                                                                                                                                                      
Egelman, A. Oates and S.  Krishnamurthi, “Oops, I Did It Again: Mitigating Repeated Access Control Errors 
on Facebook”, in Proceedings of the SIGCHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems, 2011, New 
York, ACM pp. 2295–2304. 
81 Article 29 Working Party Opinion 5/2009 on online social networking, 12 June 2009, 7, 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2009/wp163_en.pdf. 
82 Victor Mayer-Schönberger ,“Why we must remember to delete – and forget – in the digital age”, The 
Guardian, 30 June 2011, accessible at 
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2011/jun/30/remember-delete-forget-digital-age.  
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5. UNITED WE STAND 
5.1 The power of collective action 
In social networks, a large number of individuals can be harmed by the same 
illegal practice.83 Data protection laws entitle OSN users to challenge OSN providers in 
court if they believe their privacy rights have been violated.84 However, individuals 
rarely take legal action against an OSN provider. Going to court is expensive and time-
consuming, whereas the monetary value of individual claims is low, especially compared 
to the resources of these major commercial entities. 85   
In 2008, the European Commission published Green Paper on “Consumer 
Collective Redress”, which discussed existing barriers and opened the debate for 
potential solutions.86 In 2013, the Commission stressed the importance of “collective 
redress”87 as follows 
“Collective redress facilitates access to justice in particular in cases where the 
individual damage is so low that potential claimants would not think it worth 
pursuing an individual claim. It also strengthens the negotiating power of 
potential claimants and […].”88 
Moreover, it recommends all Member States to  
“have collective redress mechanisms at national level for both injunctive and 
compensatory relief, which respect the basic principles set out in this 
Recommendation.” 
Collective redress mechanisms should be available horizontally and in different areas 
where Union law grants certain rights to consumers, including data protection law.89 
                                                      
83 European Commission, Recommendation on common principles for injunctive and compensatory 
collective redress mechanisms in the Member States concerning violations of rights granted under Union 
Law, 11 June 2013, available on http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:JOL_2013_201_R_NS0013.  
84 See also B. Van Alsenoy and V. Verdoodt, “Liability and accountability of actors in social networking 
sites”, SPION D6.3, December 2014, 31 juncto 34.  
85 E. Wauters, E. Lievens and P. Valcke, “Social Networking Sites’ Terms of Use: addressing imbalances in 
the user-provider relationship through ex ante and ex post mechanisms”, JIPITEC 139, 2014, 140. 
86 European Commission, Green Paper on Consumer Collective Redress, 27 November 2011, available on 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/archive/redress_cons/greenpaper_en.pdf.  
87 At the European level, policy makers have always used the term “collective redress”, in order to 
maintain the distinction between the US class actions. See S. Voet, “European Collective Redress: A Status 
Queastionis”, International Journal of Procedural Law, vol. 4, 2014, 97-128. 
88 European Commission, Recommendation on common principles for injunctive and compensatory 
collective redress mechanisms in the Member States concerning violations of rights granted under Union 
Law, 11 June 2013, available on http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32013H0396&from=EN.  
89 European Commission, Memo: Frequently Asked Questions: European Commission recommends collective 
redress principles to Member States, Strasbourg, 11 June 2013, 2, available on 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-530_en.pdf. . 
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The Recommendation then further elaborates on (non-binding) principles that the 
Member States should take into account when crafting such mechanisms.90  
In 2011, the Article 29 Working Party urged the Commission to include collective 
redress in the proposal for a General Data Protection Regulation. The Working Party 
believes that if the focus lies too much on the individual exercising his rights, the right to 
data protection cannot be sufficiently guaranteed.91 Therefore, the Working Party 
advocates reducing the burden on claimants, for instance by extending the power to 
bring a collective action before the courts to the data protection authorities as well as to 
civil society organisations and associations representing data subject’s interests.92 
5.2 Current mechanisms 
Several EU Member States, including Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands 
and Austria already foresee in the possibility of collective action. These mechanisms 
need to be distinguished from the “class actions” that are common under the US legal 
system.93 The latter are rooted in a different legal system with specific features (e.g., 
punitive damages, contingency fees) which go beyond the European collective redress 
concept. 94 
 In Europe, three different categories of collective redress mechanisms can be 
distinguished: group actions, representative actions and test procedures.95 In group 
actions, the individual claims of a specific category of people can be brought together 
into one judicial procedure. On the other hand, a representative action can be brought 
by an organisation, a state body or an individual on behalf of a certain group. In this 
category of collective redress, the group of individuals represented will not participate 
                                                      
90 S. Voet, “European Collective Redress: A Status Queastionis”, International Journal of Procedural Law, 
vol. 4, 2014, 97-128. 
91 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Letter to Commissioner Reding, 14 January 2011, 2, available 
on 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/others/2011_01_14_letter_artwp_vp_reding_c
ommission_communication_approach_dp_en.pdf.  
92 The Commission followed the Working Party and included the possibility for collective redress in its 
proposal and was amended by the European Parliament. According to Article 73, “any body, organisation 
or association which acts in the public interest and has been properly constituted according to the law of a 
Member State shall have the right to lodge a complaint with a supervisory authority in any Member State on 
behalf of one or more data subjects if it considers that a data subject’s rights under this Regulation have been 
infringed as a result of the processing of personal data.” (European Parliament, Legislative resolution on the 
proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of individuals 
with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (General Data 
Protection Regulation), 12 March 2014, available on 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-TA-2014-
0212+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN) 
93 European Commission, Press Release: Commission recommends Member States to have collective redress 
mechanisms in place to ensure effective access to justice, 11 June 2013, available on 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-524_en.htm.  
94 S. Voet, “European Collective Redress: A Status Queastionis”, International Journal of Procedural Law, 
vol. 4, 2014, 97-128. 
95 E. Wauters, E. Lievens and P. Valcke, “Social Networking Sites’ Terms of Use: addressing imbalances in 
the user-provider relationship through ex ante and ex post mechanisms”, JIPITEC 139, 2014, 140. 
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in the procedure. Finally, during a test procedure, an individual claim will be tested and 
serve as a precedent for future cases.96 
In Belgium, collective redress was only recently introduced into Belgian Code of 
Economic Law. It is limited in scope, as it is only applicable to consumer-to-business 
disputes.97 In order to be admissible, the class action must be based on a breach of 
contract or on one of the 31 European or Belgian consumer regulations listed.98 These 
regulations also relate to privacy, intellectual property, consumer protection, etc., thus a 
claim based on a privacy infringement would be possible. Secondly, only consumer 
organisations or authorised non-profit organisations are able to bring a collective 
action.99 Finally, the Belgian law requires that the collective action would be more 
suitable than an individual action.100  
5.3 Recommendations101 
Government and consumer organisations should actively promote the use of 
collective action mechanisms. At the moment, there is an underuse of collective redress 
by OSN users.102 This may be attributed to a general lack of awareness regarding the 
possibility of collective action, for both individual consumers and consumer 
organisations. Therefore, awareness-raising initiatives should target both individual 
OSN users and consumer organisations.103 In this regard, the European Parliament 
stresses that consumer organisations and the European Consumer Centres Network 
(ECC-Net) can play a key role in sharing the possibility of collective redress to as many 
victims of infringements of EU law as possible.104 
                                                      
96 Id. 
97 Y.S. van der Sype, W. Vandenbussche, I. Samyn and N. Portugaels, “Allen tegen één: Over de 
rechtsvordering tot collectief herstel en de bescherming van persoonsgegevens op het internet.”, 
Computerrecht 2014/180, afl. 6, December 2014, 316. 
98 S. Voet, “Belgium’s New Consumer Class Action” in V. Harsagi and C.H. van Rhee (eds), Multi-Party 
Redress Mechanisms in Europe: Squeaking Mouses?, Antwerp, Intersentia, 2014, (forthcoming). 
99 Article XVII.39 Wet van 31 Maart 2014 tot invoeging van titel 2 "Rechtsvordering tot collectief herstel" 
in boek XVII "Bijzondere rechts procedures" van het Wetboek van economisch recht en houdende 
invoeging van de definities eigen aan boek XVII in boek I van het Wetboek van economisch recht. BS 29 
April 2014, 35202-35211. (Act Introducing a Consumer Collective Redress Action in the Code of Economic 
Law).  
100 The court can take the following elements into account when assessing this requirement: the amount of 
users participating, individual harm vs. the collective harm, the complexity and judicial efficiency and the 
legal certainty of the participants. However the value of the individual claims cannot be a decisive factor. 
See S. Voet, “Belgium’s New Consumer Class Action” in V. Harsagi and C.H. van Rhee (eds), Multi-Party 
Redress Mechanisms in Europe: Squeaking Mouses?, Antwerp, Intersentia, 2014, (forthcoming). 
101 The following recommendations have benefitted from the discussions that took place during the 
“Cultures of Accountability Workshop” in Leuven on 13 November 2014, co-organised by the SPION and 
PARIS projects. 
102 E. Wauters, E. Lievens and P. Valcke, “Social Networking Sites’ Terms of Use: addressing imbalances in 
the user-provider relationship through ex ante and ex post mechanisms”, JIPITEC 2014, 142. 
103 Id. 
104 European Parliament, Resolution on ‘Towards a Coherent Approach to Collective Redress’, 2 February 
2012, available on http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-TA-
2012-0021+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN.  
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  Civil society and consumer organisations should receive sufficient resources 
to undertake collective redress procedures. At the moment, the cost of litigation is too 
high and many organisations lack the sufficient resources to start a collective action.105 
These organisations need funding in order to overcome the costs threshold of going to 
court.106 In addition, data protection authorities require adequate resources to enforce 
data protection legislation. If DPAs concluded that an entity violated data protection law, 
this would ease the burden of proof for individuals to claim damages.  
 
Develop standard monetary damages for non-economic harm. Currently, there 
are no widely accepted objective parameters to estimate the privacy suffered by 
individuals. Very often, courts award only a symbolic sum (e.g., 1 euro) for moral 
damages.107  While there are exceptions108, the current approach places too great a 
burden on individuals to demonstrate tangible economic harm.109  
 
Enhance coordination and foster cooperation between different 
organisations advocating consumer rights. At the moment, there is a lack of 
coordination between different consumer organisations qualified to bring collective 
action in the different EU Member States.110 They should cooperate, not only nationally 
but also on a European level. The European and international organisations that 
advocate consumer rights, such as BEUC or Consumers International, could play an 
important role in this respect.111 
 
  
                                                      
105 E. Wauters, E. Lievens and P. Valcke, “Social Networking Sites’ Terms of Use: addressing imbalances in 
the user-provider relationship through ex ante and ex post mechanisms”, l.c., 147. 
106 For instance, the European Consumer Organisation (BEUC) strongly backs the creation of a public fund 
dedicated to the financing of collective redress brought by consumer organisations. See, BEUC, Litigation 
funding in relation to the establishment of a European mechanism of collective redress, 2 February 2012, 
accessible at http://www.beuc.org/publications/2012-00074-01-e.pdf.  
107 E.g., Court of First Instance of Brussels, 15 October 2009, AM 2010/2, Luik, 30 June 2010, AM 2010/5-6, 
551, etc.). 
108 For instance, in a case concerning a Belgian commercial broadcaster who had aired a TV programme 
showing damaging footage of a person without obtaining this person’s consent, the court took into 
account the audience measurement (702 000 viewers) and estimated the moral damages at 702 000 
Belgian francs (17 402 EUR) See Court of First Instance of Brussels (33th Ch.), 19 May 2000, AM 2000/3, 
338.  
109 See also the analysis of Y.S. van der Sype, W. Vandenbussche, I. Samyn and N. Portugaels, “Allen tegen 
één: Over de rechtsvordering tot collectief herstel en de bescherming van persoonsgegevens op het 
internet.”, Computerrecht 2014/180, afl. 6, December 2014. 
110 E. Wauters, E. Lievens and P. Valcke, o.c., 147. 
111 Id. 
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6. PETS MAKE GOOD COMPANIONS 
6.1 PETs and Privacy by Design 
Borking and Blarkom have defined Privacy Enhancing Technologies (“PETs”) as 
“a system of ICT measures protecting informational privacy by eliminating or 
minimising personal data thereby preventing unnecessary or unwanted 
processing of personal data, without the loss of the functionality of the 
information system.” 
Generally speaking, PETs can fulfil one of the following functions:  
- to reduce the risk of violating privacy and data protection legislation;  
- to minimise the amount of personal data that is being processed; and  
- to increase the amount of control of individuals or enhance transparency over the 
processing of their personal data.112  
Examples of PETs include encryption113, anonymisation or pseudonymisation 
techniques, which can be implemented without hampering the user’s social media 
experience.114  
The need to implement PETs has been emphasised in the discourse on privacy by 
design.115 Privacy by design is a multifaceted concept.116 In policy and legal documents it 
is often explained broadly as a general principle, whereas engineers’ and system 
developers’ often associate it with the actual implementation of PETs.117 Ideally, privacy 
by design is a more comprehensive approach for avoiding risks to privacy; a 
methodology to incorporate privacy principles in system design, which involves the 
implementation of PETs.118 According to the International Conference of Data Protection 
and Privacy Commissioners, it is a 
                                                      
112 London Economics, “Study on the economic benefits of privacy-enhancing technologies (PET’s)”, Final 
Report to the European Commission DG Justice Freedom and Security, July 2010, ix. 
113 An example of an encryption technique developped specifically for OSN is “Scramble”: see F. Beato, M. 
Kohlweiss and K. Wouters, “Scramble! Your Social Network Data”, in S. Fischer-Hubner and N. Hopper 
(Eds.): PETS 2011, LNCS 6794, pp. 211–225, 2011 accessible at 
https://www.cosic.esat.kuleuven.be/publications/article-2029.pdf.  
114 G. Hornung, “Regulating privacy enhancing technologies. Seizing the opportunity of the future 
European Data Protection Framework”, Innovation: The European Journal of Social Science Research 2013, 
Vol. 26, 182. 
115 However, Privacy by design is broader than implementing PETs, it includes for instance also privacy-
friendly default settings. See also D. Klitou, Privacy-Invading Technologies and Privacy by Design: 
Safeguarding Privacy, Liberty and Security in the 21st Century, Information Technology and Law Series, The 
Hague, Asser Press, 2014, 270. 
116 European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA), “Privacy and Data Protection 
by Design – from policy to engineering”, December 2014, 3, available on 
http://www.enisa.europa.eu/activities/identity-and-trust/library/deliverables/privacy-and-data-
protection-by-design.  
117 Idem. See also S. Gürses, C. Tronsoco and C. Diaz, “Engineering Privacy by Design”, accessible at  
https://www.cosic.esat.kuleuven.be/publications/article-1542.pdf 
118 D. Klitou, Privacy-Invading Technologies and Privacy by Design: Safeguarding Privacy, Liberty and 
Security in the 21st Century, Information Technology and Law Series, The Hague, Asser Press, 2014, 270. 
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“holistic concept that may be applied to operations throughout an 
organisation, end-to-end including its information technology practices, 
processes, physical design and networked infrastructure.”119 
Privacy by design has also found its way into the proposed General data 
protection Regulation.120 Article 23 of the proposed Regulation requires data controllers 
to implement appropriate technical and organisational safeguards. This requirement has 
to be fulfilled both at the time of determining the purposes and means of the processing 
and the time of the processing itself. Furthermore, data controllers have to ensure that 
data protection is embedded within the entire lifecycle of the technology, from the 
design phase all the way to the final disposal.121 
 
6.2 No PETs allowed? 
To date, there has been no large-scale adoption of PETs.122 There are several 
possible reasons for this. First, many system developers are not yet familiar with privacy 
principles or privacy-friendly technologies. Most of the time their work merely focuses 
on the technical aspects and the realisation of functional requirements.123 In addition, 
data protection authorities do not have sufficient resources to evaluate the degree of 
implementation of PETs in todays’ ICT landscape.124  
From the perspective of an OSN provider, there is are generally insufficient 
incentives to commit to the implementation of PETs. Most of the time these technologies 
do not offer any direct commercial advantages and OSN providers therefore do not feel 
inclined to invest in the implementation of PETs. In addition, OSN providers are always 
careful to avoid any constraints for the future use of the data they collect (e.g., no longer 
being available to cross-reference user-provided data with data collected from other 
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sources).125 Certain OSN providers have even gone so far as to restrict the use of PETs 
on their platforms.126  
6.3 Recommendations 
The legal framework should attach greater importance to PETs. The current 
legal framework places far greater emphasis on the ex-post securing of personal data 
than on an ex-ante elimination of risk.127 Instead, law and technology should 
complement the protection of individuals’ rights to privacy and data protection.128  
Governments should lead by example. By adopting PETs in their own systems 
and infrastructure, governments can impact future assessments of what reasonably can 
be expected from data controllers.129 As a result, the demand of privacy by design will 
increase, which in turn will stimulate the market for privacy-friendly services.130  
The research community, policy makers and data protection authorities 
should enhance PET awareness.131 Awareness is the first step towards adoption. 
Research has shown that awareness is far from universal, although some PETs are much 
better known than others.132 Efforts should be made to increase awareness among 
different target groups, including software developers and system providers, 
policymakers and data controllers.133 
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Increase incentives for PETs adoption.134 At the moment, there is a lack of 
incentive for service providers and system manufacturers to develop privacy-friendly 
and legally compliant services and products.135 ENISA has recommended several 
measures to increase the incentive for adopting PETs, such as audit schemes, seals, 
higher penalties, or taking into account the implementation of PETs when deciding upon 
penalties for privacy infringements.136  
Promote further standardisation and recognition of PETs. In order to increase 
implementation in practice, standardisation bodies need to provide more standards for 
privacy-friendly features. In addition, other initiatives to promote the recognition of 
these technologies should be explored, including voluntary accreditation or official 
endorsements by regulators.137 
Consider labelling restrictions on the use PETs as an “unfair commercial 
practice”. OSN providers sometimes restrict the adoption of PETs in relation to their 
services. The Unfair Commercial Practice Directive foresees in a list of commercial 
practices that are in all circumstances considered unfair and forbidden.138 One way to 
safeguard the use of PETs in an OSN environment would be to label restrictions upon the 
use of PETs as an unfair commercial practice. 
PETs are not a “silver bullet”. The potential impact of PETs in creating privacy-
friendly social networks should not be overestimated. The mere implementation of PETs 
is not sufficient to protect the privacy of individual OSN users.139 PETs can still be 
circumvented, although the level of difficulty depending on the level of sophistication of 
the PET.140 For instance, anonymisation techniques are vulnerable, considering the 
possibility of de-anonymisation through sophisticated data analysis and data mining 
techniques.141   
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7. CONCLUSION 
There is no one-size-fits-all solution for mitigating privacy and security concerns 
in OSN platforms. It is rather a combination of different approaches, which reflect the 
different roles of the actors in an OSN environment. Throughout our research, five 
themes emerged from which we elaborated a set of policy recommendations. These 
recommendations focus on the one hand on providing the means and knowledge to 
empower users, while on the other hand enhancing the accountability of OSN providers. 
 Invest in education and awareness. More and more children and youngsters are 
joining OSNs. These platforms provide a lot of opportunities for young people 
especially in terms of socialisation, access to information and learning. However, 
it is important to keep in mind that there are challenges related to the use of 
OSNs. It is crucial that these young OSN users are well informed and aware of the 
potential risks OSNs may pose. Formal education has an important role to play 
here, as schools are able to reach most, if not all children.  
 Move beyond the limits of notice and choice. Considering the amount of data 
collected on OSN platforms, it is important that OSN users are properly informed 
about these processing activities. Feedback and awareness tools can complement 
ex ante transparency mechanism and promote greater understanding and 
reflection of individuals. In addition, policymakers and regulators should set clear 
boundaries for OSN providers and third parties to determine whether certain 
processing activities are acceptable or not.  
 Defaults matter. OSN users are often prevented from taking decisions related to 
their privacy. Their decision-making process is complicated by several factors, 
including inter alia audience visibility, cognitive and behavioural constraints, etc. 
Privacy-friendly default settings can go a long way in protecting privacy and 
decrease the burden on individuals.  
 Promote collective redress. Individuals find it difficult to enforce their privacy 
rights and rarely take legal action. Collective redress mechanisms can 
significantly reduce the burden on individuals and facilitate access to justice. Civil 
society and consumer organisations should receive sufficient resources to initiate 
and co-ordinate collective redress procedures. 
 PETs make good companions. Traditional regulatory instruments are unable to 
cope with the challenges posed by modern data processing. By shifting the focus 
from ex-post securing of personal data to ex-ante elimination of risk and shaping   
technology in a privacy-friendly way, the risk of violating privacy and data 
protection legislation can be reduced significantly. 
